History and Influences on South East Asia

History and Influences on South East Asia CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION If there were only two men in the world, how would they get on? They would help one another, harm one another, flatter one another, slander one another, fight one another, make it up, they could neither live together nor do without one another Philosophical Dictionary, 1764 Increasing role of China in South Asia has attracted the attention of the policy framers as well as scholars. Its foreign policy towards Southeast Asia has varied from indifference to hostility, but Chinese interest in the region has persisted since 1949. While India occupies a vital position in the Chinese calculation, there are discernible variations in Chinese policy towards other states in the region. The behaviour of Southeast Asian states towards China has also varied. Notwithstanding the persistence of the Indian factor in their perceptions, we observe different response to Chinese behaviour and policy in these states. Chinese foreign policy is undergoing a metamorphosis never seen in the history of the Peoples Republic (PRC). The country has enjoyed a more secure place in the world than before, yet it has remained dissatisfied with its international status. Chinas quest for international legitimacy and a positive image is tested by its pursuit of security interests and the power politics logic of its own and other states. Chinese foreign policy strategy has equally stressed the need to protect its national interest in a threatening world and the struggle to remold the international environment in line with its preferences. Clearly PRC foreign policy is complicated, dynamic, and consequential. China has managed to become a rising star in the international arena, both politically and economically. The bipolar world order lasting for nearly half a century came eventually to an abrupt end in the closing months of the 1980s as a result of dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the so-called post cold w ar era began in the final decade of this century. China has some motivations in the Southeast Asia one of these is China is in pursuit of hegemony[1] in the region, another possibility is primarily defensive an attempt to neutralize the region while China focuses on internal priorities and the third possibility is to have a cooperative structure. India is seeking an expanded role in the international Geo-political arena which includes Asia and Southeast Asia. Indias growing economy ,common energy security interests, national interest, and power projection makes India China a Peer competitor. Beijings current goal in southeast Asia is to maintain a stable environment around its periphery to assure others that China is not threat, and to encourage economic ties that contribute to Chinas economic modernization and thus regime stability. The foreign policy instruments that Beijing has employed to secure its goals are constituent throughout most of Southeast Asia, but the priorities assigned to different strategic goals vary depending on Chinas interest in different part of the region. CHAPTER II METHODOLOGY STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM To examine the current politico-economic influences in South east Asia and recommend measures for India to significantly expand its politico-economic strategic influence in the South East Asian region with a view to counterbalance the overwhelming Chinese politico – economic dominance in the South East Asian Region.. Justification of the Study The most significant strategic development after the Cold War, is probably the sudden growth in Chinas economic potential and consequent national power. A rapid rise in power of a major country in the past has usually led to tension in the region, conflict with the neighbours and eventually a war. To make an assessment of Chinas posture well into the future is fraught with number of uncertainties. Equally, a projection of that role in the next century would, of necessity, demand an intimate acquaintance with how the Chinese have been involved in their dealings with this part of the world in the past. Above all, how that relationship has evolved, to the present day environment. Idea shall be to restrict the paper and sketch out important events in the near past, which have shaped the present and loom larger than the hoary past on the future that is yet in the limbo. The basic intention in writing this dissertation is To examine the current politico-economic influences in South east As ia and recommend measures for India to significantly expand its politico-economic strategic influence in the South East Asian region with a view to counterbalance the overwhelming Chinese politico – economic dominance in the South East Asian . A direct question has been addressed whether or not China restricts India from emerging as a global player. Scope Axiomatically any meaningful discussion of Chinas role in Southeast Asia would imply an understanding of its relations with the Indian subcontinent as a whole. Of the worlds great powers, China is geographically the closest to the Southeast Asian countries. It has common borders with Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Caombodia. There is significant cultural similarities far reaching political and strategic repercussions over the past couple of centuries, and has propelled the worlds most populous regions into interaction in a wide variety of ways. From a simple geographical perspective, qualitative changes in the Chinas foreign policy should be expected if China grows from a medium-sized power to superpower. At its present rate of economic growth, Chinas productive capabilities and total wealth will soon outstrip those of the other Asian powers. As a weaker power, Chinas dependence on the favour of its neighbours has been comparatively high. But increased relative capabilities make i t feasible for a rising great power to exert greater control over its surroundings. If the opportunity arises to establish a dominant role in the region, China can be expected to seize it. Thus the scope of this paper has been restricted to Chinese dominance in the Southeast Asian region, which will pose vexing problems for India . An attempt has been made to analyse, how India can focus and counterbalance the overwhelming Chinese politico – economic dominance in the South East Asian. Organisation of Dissertation. The study is proposed to be dealt in the following sequence: Modern History strat influences in South East Asia. Political Economy of South East Asia. Chinese political and economical strategy in South East Asia. Indian political and economical strategy in South East Asia. Comparative Analysis of Indian Chinese politico-economic strategies in SE Asia. Recommended response of India to expand its influence in the region. CHAPTER III MODERN HISTORY AND STRATEGIC INFLUENCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA The post-Cold War world is seeing in some areas a resurgence of nationalism and in others a greater emphasis on regionalism. These two tendencies will overlap. In Southeast Asia national and ethnic differences were significantly blunted by European colonialism and in some cases have been further submerged in the post-colonial period of new nation states. But what is new in Southeast Asia is the development of voluntary (as distinct from externally mandated) cooperation on a sub-regional or regional level. Most recently there is the assertion of an Asian identity, shared by Southeast Asians, which is sharply distinguished from Western value systems, social norms and economic models. It is too early to say how far that will be taken or how much it will influence the political and social development of Southeast Asia. The very important differences between and indeed even within the Southeast Asian countries induces some skepticism in academic circles about the existence of Asian values [2] etc. But there is no doubt that there is a perception in the region of some essential shared values or priorities, and a rejection of what are seen as Western individualistic and libertarian values. An embryonic sense of shared interests transcending ethnic or national groups emerged in colonial times between independence movements, student movements and other groups, including notably the various Marxist-inspired or communist movements in the region. But until after the Pacific War there was little connection across the region. The colonial empires were very separate and governed on different principles. It is a common observation nowadays that Australia, on the fringe of the region, only recently and belatedly become aware of and involved with its Southeast Asian neighbors. That is true, though with some qualifications. There was peripheral contact in the north even before the Europeans colonized Australia. But in the colonial era there was no steady development of contact or interest. The shifting patterns of alliance politics in Europe affected such contacts as there were between the colonial administrations in Southeast Asia and Australia, and indeed between the Southeast A sian colonial administrations themselves. Australia was not unique, or even unusual, in having little contact with its neighbors and in having its external links directed principally along the lines laid down by the metropolitan power. What are now the independent nations of Southeast Asia also had little contact with each other during the European colonial period. Just as the lines of communication and trade ran from Melbourne and Sydney to London, so did those between the French, Dutch, and other British colonies and the respective metropolitan powers in Europe. Right up to the Pacific War there was little or no communication between, for example, what are now Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The links ran from Manila to the United States, from Batavia to the Netherlands, from Hanoi to France, and so on. It was the remarkable Japanese campaign which began at the end of 1941 which precipitated or accelerated the radical changes which took place between 1945 and the end of the Vietnam war. The sheer speed and success of the Japanese successes against numerically superior defending forces in Southeast Asia made a strong impression on opinion in the erstwhile colonies. The Japanese failed to capitalize on that in the sense that after early political successes in encouraging nationalist and pro-Japanese movements the appeal to shared Asian interests lost plausibility in the face of Japanese policies and actions which were exploitative or worse. Although Japan lost the war and left wounds in the region which are still not healed, the war precipitated the end of the moribund European colonial era, and accelerated the creation of independent states largely within borders established by the colonial empires. For some years trade and other economic links remained predominantly in the old colon ial grooves but with the economic supremacy of the United States and then with Japan embarked on decades of the highest rates of economic growth the world had yet seen, those patterns diversified. In the region the United States and Japan became the two most important outside powers and that was reflected inter alia by their leading roles in the setting up of the Asian Development Bank in 1966. By that time Australia[3] too had perforce diversified its trade away from Britain which had made it clear that it would seek its future economic arrangements in Europe and the Commonwealth arrangements which had supported much of Australias traditional export industry were phased out. Australia turned to Japan and others for new markets (a trade agreement with Japan had already been made in 1957). Australias development assistance programme had from the beginning concentrated on Southeast Asia and become and increasingly important instrument for involving this country with the region, especially as significant numbers of students from the region came to our universities and other institutions under the Colombo Plan and successor programmes.The failure of the attempted coup in Indonesia, the Gestapu of 30 September 1965, and the subsequent establishment of the New Order government there opened the way to overcome the regional or sub-regional strains produced by President Sukarnos eff orts to crush the newly-constructed Malaysia, as well as other tensions created or exacerbated by the Sukarno policies. In this climate ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations, was established in 1967 and set out on its long and successful course of gradually building a sense of common interest and regional association among the six (originally five) members. ASEAN recently embarked on the development of AFTA, the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. ASEAN has become the key institution in Southeast Asia not only because of its success in developing a sense of community among its very disparate members, and in finding a road for them to closer economic cooperation. It has also become the forum for discussion with the main world powers on a wide range of matters. This has come about through an annual mechanism of post-Ministerial consultations held after ASEANs own internal consultations through which ASEAN member governments, at Foreign Minister level, meet with their counterparts. These counterparts, termed dialogue partners, currently are Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and the United States. In 1994 discussions on regional security were further developed with the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which groups ASEAN and its dialogue partners with Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea. Looking at the recent evolution of Southeast Asia perhaps the most sig nificant thing has been the change that has occurred since the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of communism. Until relatively recently the centrally planned economy model had much attraction for many developing countries and there was up to the beginning of the eighties quite widespread aversion to capitalism and to the liberal market model as exemplified by the Western industrialized countries. Now virtually all of Southeast Asia is committed to market economics, albeit with more governmental political control than in the Western countries. There is a virtual unanimity about the commitment to economic development based on relatively open markets, private ownership and competition. With that has come a period of unprecedented economic growth. The major economies of Southeast Asia are all growing at rates previously thought unattainable for a sustained period. There are of course some uncertainties about the future; but there are few who doubt that Southeast Asia will early i n the twenty-first century be a major centre of economic power and influence. Southeast Asia has traditionally been a site of great power competition for regional dominance, due to its strategic location as a bridge between continental and maritime East Asia. To manage this competition and to enhance their own sub regional autonomy, the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) engaged in a number of regional institution building initiatives during the early 1990s. This institutionalism agenda led to speculation that ASEAN could become the hub of a nascent regional security community following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, however, the prospect that ASEAN could act as an autonomous entity to mitigate Sino-U.S. geopolitical pressures seemed increasingly tenuous. Weakened by political and economic instability, intra-regional disputes and a simultaneous expansion of its membership, ASEAN has come to question its own identity. This has only further undermined ASEAN-led regional security initiatives such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF ). More frequently, Southeast Asian states have favored bilateralism and have looked to external powers to realize their security interests. These changing sub regional dynamics have, in turn, prompted renewed efforts by China and the United States to cultivate influence within Southeast Asia. Chinas attempts to gain support for its new security concept and US efforts to secure additional access and infrastructure agreements along the East Asian littoral are illustrative. To some extent, Sino-U.S. geopolitical competition has been modified by strategic cooperation resulting from the war on terror. China still remains wary of U.S. attempts to engage Southeast Asia in countering global terrorism. These trends have, in turn, compelled analysts to reconceptualize the Southeast Asian security landscape in a balance of power context. It is clear continental Southeast Asian states have aligned with China and maritime Southeast Asian states have aligned with the United States. The geographi c position of China and the United States, and the evolution of their interests and military capabilities accordingly, make it unlikely that either country would seek to project power into the others respective sphere. Southeast Asian states maintain a position of equidistance between the great powers. She attributes this to the ASEAN states general distrust of great powers and their desire to maintain the delicate Sino-U.S. regional balance. CHAPTER IV POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH EAST ASIA China sleeps, when she wakes, the World will tremble Napoleon The South east Asian countries over the past four decades has transformed itself from a region with enormous economic and political problems to one blessed with relative peace and prosperity. In particular the five ASEAN economies, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand , grew strongly in the 1960s with an average rate of 6 percent. This buoyant economic performance continued in the 1970s with 7.3 percent as they benefited from the massive inflows of the foreign exchange earnings due to sharp increase in the world price of primary commodities, including two oil shocks which benefited some of the members the same period. In the 1980s the region slowed down to an average growth rate of 6.1 percent. Regional economies experienced recessionary conditions due to high interest rate policy of the US Federal Reserve Bank, the consequent debt crisis in the region, the recession in the ASEANs major trading and investment partners, and the fall in the world prices of the primary commodities. But there was also a positive trend of influx of export- oriented foreign direct investment from Japan and the NIEs following the strong appreciation of their currencies. The recovery from 1991 to 1996 was followed by an economic contraction in 1997-98 due to the crisis which began in Thailand in July 1997 and spread to other parts of the region. In 1999-2000, the ASEAN economies staged a dramatic recovery with Singapore and Malaysia leading, things again turned sour with the September 11 attacks and the lackluster performance of the export sector. There was again a decrease in the economic growth due to the SARS, Iraq cri sis and terrorist related attacks, slump in the electronic market and collapse of the WTO talks in Cancun. The global economy is most rapid in emerging Asia where GDP accelerated to 7.2 percent in 2003, accounting for about 50 per cent of world growth. Looking forward, growth is projected to remain high at 7.4 per cent in 2004 and 7.0 per cent in 2005. The IMF stated that while domestic demand growth has increased significantly in emerging Asia, the regional current account surpluses remain very large, with exports supported by the rebound in the information technology (IT) sector as well as depreciating exchange rates. In the ASEAN-4, Thailand has shown the strongest expansion at 6.7 per cent in 2003, and is expected to remain high at 7 per cent in 2004 and 6.7 per cent in 2005. Cyclical considerations and high levels of public debt necessitate fiscal prudence for Thai authorities. The Malaysian economy is also recovering strongly and is expected to continue with inflation and unemployment remaining at low levels. However, the main policy priorities are the implementation of the announced fiscal consolidation to achieve a balanced budget by the year 2006 and greater exchange rate flexibility accompanied with suitable macroeconomic policies. Indonesias modest growth continues to be driven by private consumption, and has been accompanied with lower inflation. The Indonesian government should continue to implement its planned fiscal consolidation. Moreover, it needs to sustain banking, legal and judicial reforms in order to provide a better investment climate conducive to higher growth. As for the Philippines, uncertainties remain high even after the May 2, 2004 presidential elections. The main concerns of the Philippine government include increasing the tax revenues, restructuring the power sector, strengthening the banking sector, and improving the business system. Following the SARS crisis, the Singapore economy recovered in 2003 with supportive macroeconomic policies. To enhance its medium-term competitiveness and growth prospects, the IMF recommends a deepening and acceleration of reforms including further divestment of government  ­linked companies Issues and Challenges for Southeast Asian/ASEAN Domestic policy issues and challenges. On the domestic front, the growth prospects for ASEAN are very much dependent on various factors including the ability of their respective governments to provide economic, political and social stability, implement economic reforms, and diversify their economies. ASEAN policy makers thus face the following challenges: Sound macroeconomic environment. Following the 1997/98 economic crisis, government budget deficits relative to GDP have broadly increased and this is of serious concern for ASEAN governments, particularly for Malaysia and the Philippines. Price instability has become a serious concern for Indonesia and the Philippines. Exchange rates in Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines and Myanmar have weakened significantly. Moreover, the rising levels of foreign debt in the Philippines and Indonesia could create additional uncertainties. In terms of the current account surplus as a proportion of GDP, the six older ASEAN members have broadly shown higher levels relative to Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV countries). Thus, in order to achieve a sound macroeconomic environment, ASEAN economies need to adopt a prudent fiscal policy, low inflation rates, stable exchange rates, and manageable levels of external debt and current account balance. Stable political and business environment. The political environment in some countries has been affected by military uprisings, kidnappings, bombings and other terrorist-related activities, peoples demonstrations, and elections. A 1997 survey of Japanese firms conducted by JETRO indicated that political stability is considered as the most significant determinant of Japanese investments in ASEAN. Thus Southeast Asian governments need to find ways and means towards achieving and maintaining a politically stable environment in order to encourage domestic and foreign investments. Social Harmony. ASEAN countries need to address issues such as conflicts between racial groups (e.g. the Chinese and pribumis in Indonesia, and the Chinese and bumiputras in Malaysia), between religious groups (e.g. the Muslims and Christians in Southern Philippines) and between the poor and rich. Despite all the policies and resources spent on alleviating poverty and reducing income inequality, unemployment, poverty and income inequality continue to be the major policy concerns of ASEAN governments. In reality, it is very difficult to reduce poverty and narrow the income gap given the interplay of politics, economics and industry, and the conflicting goals of the various interest groups in the economy like businesses, religious groups, the elite, farmers, small and medium entrepreneurs, etc. Thailands income gap between the rich and the poor was the widest in the world (Bangkok Post, 2S Aug 2003). In the Philippines, Gerard Clark and Marites Sison (2003) in their study titled liDo t he well-off really care about the plight of the poor? revealed that majority of the respondents suggested that some elite people cared while others did not; and those who did care did too little or acted primarily out of self-interest. In fact, there are some people in the superior group like the elite who wish the poor to remain poor because of the benefits that can be derived from their poverty. For instance, politicians often depend on the poor at elections time for support that propels them to political office. Economic Reforms. Southeast Asian governments need to continue implementing economic reforms that include market opening, trade, investment and financial liberalization. These reforms are particularly crucial for the CLMV countries as they undergo transition from centrally planned to market  ­oriented economies and for the crisis-hit countries especially Indonesia and Thailand. In the case of Indonesia, there was a lack of seriousness on the part of the political leadership to undertake economic reforms. For example, there were delays in the removal of tariff control and the privatization of state assets and enterprises, so that the process of reforms is reverting to protectionism. Furthermore, a delay in the IMFs financial assistance added to the ineffectiveness of Indonesias recovery programme. Thailand completed its 34-month Stand-By Arrangement from the IMF that formed part of an international financial package worth US$17.2 billion from multilateral and bilateral lenders. Outs tanding obligations at end-June 2002 amounted to US$6.4 billion and repayment was finally completed on July 31,2003, some two years ahead of schedule a significant achievement on the part of the Thai government. Economic Diversion. Various factors impel ASEAN economies to continue to diversify their economies: volatile and broadly declining primary commodity prices, depletion of non-renewable primary resources such as oil and gas, and the high costs of production. Following the decline in crude oil prices in the 1980s, Brunei and Indonesia have begun to diversify their economies from oil towards non-oil products and services (finance, tourism). Because of the high costs of production (e.g. high labour costs), Singapores economy has emphasised the significant contribution of the services sector (IT, education, tourism, finance). The services sector has accounted for about 60-70 per cent of Singapores GDP. Moreover, to improve the competitiveness of Singapores manufactured products and services, several cost-cutting measures have been implemented, namely, cuts in contribution rates for mandatory saving, reduction in corporate taxes, and reduction in utility charges. Long-run policies include t raining and re-training programmes for workers and greater focus on RD activities for innovations and improvement in technology. In Singapore, there are more than 600,000 workers with secondary education or lower. As such, it is extremely important that these workers upgrade their skills and learn new tasks to be more productive and to be more employable in the future. There are also other schemes such as the job re-design programmes implemented by the Singapore Productivity and Standards Board which involves changing both job content and arrangement to encourage workers to become more productive. Other ASEAN countries can learn from Singapores experiences with regard to cost-cutting measures, training and re-training programmes, and RD activities to improve productivity and competitiveness. Multi-Ethnic States. Multi-ethnicity is a dominant feature of the region and therefore stable inter-state ties and intra-state ethnic stability are closely intertwined. The region has to work toward the stability and security of strong, secular, federal multi- ethnic states if it is to remain secure and stable in the coming years. The Challenge of Democratisaton. The other key political challenge that confronts South East Asian nations is how to build stable, democratic state structures in condition of a rising tide of expectations for better life and greater liberty. Through much of Asia, the struggle between pressures for democratization against existing authoritarian state structures or oppressive socio-political conditions is a reality. Human rights abuses are common in many of the states. In Myanmar and Indonesia there is a rising pressure for political change and expansion of political rights. Militancy, insurgency and terrorism have wracked many parts of ASEAN region in the past and continue to do so even now. Only through steady democratization, decentralization and provision of caring and efficient governance can the integrity of state structures and stability be preserved. CHAPTER V Chinese political and economical strategy in South East Asia. China perceives itself as a central power on Earth. The rest of the World is an array of greater and lesser powers which neither have unified structure nor a single head Macnall Mark[4] Chinas political and economic strategy are interlinked with the security relation that China shares with the Southeast Asia as a region. China embraced the Southeast Asian regionalism and of multilateralism with Southeast Asia is part of broader decision to jettison Chinas old confrontational policy and style. Chinese leaders officials turned this approach to South east Asia on its head replacing the assertiveness that characterized pre 1997 Chinese policy with accommodation. This concerted campaign assuaged South east Asian fears but also paved the way for South east Asian and Chinese to participate in and profit from this rapidly expanding economic ties. Chinese leaders and officials smoothly employed diplomacy in innumerable meeting with South east Asian counterparts to slowly and carefully win greater influence in south east Asia. The Chinese foreign policy community made a concerted effort to represent Chinas reemergence as a regional power. It portrayed recent trends as aligne d with the economic and security interests of its southern neighbors. China convinced the neighbors that it is not a threat. China employed the same set of instruments of Chinese national security policy at both multilateral level with ASEAN and bilateral level with individual ASEAN states albeit with differing effects in the countries concerned depending on their individual circumstances. It places contentious issues temporarily to the side, places processes before product and welcomes efforts to build EAST ASIAN community. Beijing binds the South East Asean countries with a spectrum of economic, political and cultural and security proposals. As Beijing courted its southern neighbors, it supplemented diplomacy with economic ties in terms of trade and economic investment. China opened China to overseas ethnic Chinese and invited ethnic Chinese Southeast Asians to invest in China and subsequently invited Southeast Asians. Rapid increases in the Southeast Asian- China trade led to ove rcome the financial crisis. Chinas economic success has been as impressive as its diplomatic campaign, because china and Southeast Asian countries have been competitors both FDI and for developed markets in Japan,Europe and the United States. Beijing has worked assiduously tp provide Southeast Asian economies with a stake in Chinas economic expansion thus stabilizing Chinas periphery and contributing to Chinas own economic growth. Chinas turn to multilateralism diplomacy was to compliment its intense bilateral diplomacy was timely. ASEAN grew during the 1990 and accommodated new countries and also in the due course of time it had not been able to respond to the financial crisis and also the turmoil in East Timor. Chinas help to ASEAN gave a new appearance to ASEAN. Multilateral diplomacy provided a two way street for ASEAN countries and China and provided measures to forge new bonds. ASEAN also History and Influences on South East Asia History and Influences on South East Asia CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION If there were only two men in the world, how would they get on? They would help one another, harm one another, flatter one another, slander one another, fight one another, make it up, they could neither live together nor do without one another Philosophical Dictionary, 1764 Increasing role of China in South Asia has attracted the attention of the policy framers as well as scholars. Its foreign policy towards Southeast Asia has varied from indifference to hostility, but Chinese interest in the region has persisted since 1949. While India occupies a vital position in the Chinese calculation, there are discernible variations in Chinese policy towards other states in the region. The behaviour of Southeast Asian states towards China has also varied. Notwithstanding the persistence of the Indian factor in their perceptions, we observe different response to Chinese behaviour and policy in these states. Chinese foreign policy is undergoing a metamorphosis never seen in the history of the Peoples Republic (PRC). The country has enjoyed a more secure place in the world than before, yet it has remained dissatisfied with its international status. Chinas quest for international legitimacy and a positive image is tested by its pursuit of security interests and the power politics logic of its own and other states. Chinese foreign policy strategy has equally stressed the need to protect its national interest in a threatening world and the struggle to remold the international environment in line with its preferences. Clearly PRC foreign policy is complicated, dynamic, and consequential. China has managed to become a rising star in the international arena, both politically and economically. The bipolar world order lasting for nearly half a century came eventually to an abrupt end in the closing months of the 1980s as a result of dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the so-called post cold w ar era began in the final decade of this century. China has some motivations in the Southeast Asia one of these is China is in pursuit of hegemony[1] in the region, another possibility is primarily defensive an attempt to neutralize the region while China focuses on internal priorities and the third possibility is to have a cooperative structure. India is seeking an expanded role in the international Geo-political arena which includes Asia and Southeast Asia. Indias growing economy ,common energy security interests, national interest, and power projection makes India China a Peer competitor. Beijings current goal in southeast Asia is to maintain a stable environment around its periphery to assure others that China is not threat, and to encourage economic ties that contribute to Chinas economic modernization and thus regime stability. The foreign policy instruments that Beijing has employed to secure its goals are constituent throughout most of Southeast Asia, but the priorities assigned to different strategic goals vary depending on Chinas interest in different part of the region. CHAPTER II METHODOLOGY STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM To examine the current politico-economic influences in South east Asia and recommend measures for India to significantly expand its politico-economic strategic influence in the South East Asian region with a view to counterbalance the overwhelming Chinese politico – economic dominance in the South East Asian Region.. Justification of the Study The most significant strategic development after the Cold War, is probably the sudden growth in Chinas economic potential and consequent national power. A rapid rise in power of a major country in the past has usually led to tension in the region, conflict with the neighbours and eventually a war. To make an assessment of Chinas posture well into the future is fraught with number of uncertainties. Equally, a projection of that role in the next century would, of necessity, demand an intimate acquaintance with how the Chinese have been involved in their dealings with this part of the world in the past. Above all, how that relationship has evolved, to the present day environment. Idea shall be to restrict the paper and sketch out important events in the near past, which have shaped the present and loom larger than the hoary past on the future that is yet in the limbo. The basic intention in writing this dissertation is To examine the current politico-economic influences in South east As ia and recommend measures for India to significantly expand its politico-economic strategic influence in the South East Asian region with a view to counterbalance the overwhelming Chinese politico – economic dominance in the South East Asian . A direct question has been addressed whether or not China restricts India from emerging as a global player. Scope Axiomatically any meaningful discussion of Chinas role in Southeast Asia would imply an understanding of its relations with the Indian subcontinent as a whole. Of the worlds great powers, China is geographically the closest to the Southeast Asian countries. It has common borders with Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Caombodia. There is significant cultural similarities far reaching political and strategic repercussions over the past couple of centuries, and has propelled the worlds most populous regions into interaction in a wide variety of ways. From a simple geographical perspective, qualitative changes in the Chinas foreign policy should be expected if China grows from a medium-sized power to superpower. At its present rate of economic growth, Chinas productive capabilities and total wealth will soon outstrip those of the other Asian powers. As a weaker power, Chinas dependence on the favour of its neighbours has been comparatively high. But increased relative capabilities make i t feasible for a rising great power to exert greater control over its surroundings. If the opportunity arises to establish a dominant role in the region, China can be expected to seize it. Thus the scope of this paper has been restricted to Chinese dominance in the Southeast Asian region, which will pose vexing problems for India . An attempt has been made to analyse, how India can focus and counterbalance the overwhelming Chinese politico – economic dominance in the South East Asian. Organisation of Dissertation. The study is proposed to be dealt in the following sequence: Modern History strat influences in South East Asia. Political Economy of South East Asia. Chinese political and economical strategy in South East Asia. Indian political and economical strategy in South East Asia. Comparative Analysis of Indian Chinese politico-economic strategies in SE Asia. Recommended response of India to expand its influence in the region. CHAPTER III MODERN HISTORY AND STRATEGIC INFLUENCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA The post-Cold War world is seeing in some areas a resurgence of nationalism and in others a greater emphasis on regionalism. These two tendencies will overlap. In Southeast Asia national and ethnic differences were significantly blunted by European colonialism and in some cases have been further submerged in the post-colonial period of new nation states. But what is new in Southeast Asia is the development of voluntary (as distinct from externally mandated) cooperation on a sub-regional or regional level. Most recently there is the assertion of an Asian identity, shared by Southeast Asians, which is sharply distinguished from Western value systems, social norms and economic models. It is too early to say how far that will be taken or how much it will influence the political and social development of Southeast Asia. The very important differences between and indeed even within the Southeast Asian countries induces some skepticism in academic circles about the existence of Asian values [2] etc. But there is no doubt that there is a perception in the region of some essential shared values or priorities, and a rejection of what are seen as Western individualistic and libertarian values. An embryonic sense of shared interests transcending ethnic or national groups emerged in colonial times between independence movements, student movements and other groups, including notably the various Marxist-inspired or communist movements in the region. But until after the Pacific War there was little connection across the region. The colonial empires were very separate and governed on different principles. It is a common observation nowadays that Australia, on the fringe of the region, only recently and belatedly become aware of and involved with its Southeast Asian neighbors. That is true, though with some qualifications. There was peripheral contact in the north even before the Europeans colonized Australia. But in the colonial era there was no steady development of contact or interest. The shifting patterns of alliance politics in Europe affected such contacts as there were between the colonial administrations in Southeast Asia and Australia, and indeed between the Southeast A sian colonial administrations themselves. Australia was not unique, or even unusual, in having little contact with its neighbors and in having its external links directed principally along the lines laid down by the metropolitan power. What are now the independent nations of Southeast Asia also had little contact with each other during the European colonial period. Just as the lines of communication and trade ran from Melbourne and Sydney to London, so did those between the French, Dutch, and other British colonies and the respective metropolitan powers in Europe. Right up to the Pacific War there was little or no communication between, for example, what are now Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The links ran from Manila to the United States, from Batavia to the Netherlands, from Hanoi to France, and so on. It was the remarkable Japanese campaign which began at the end of 1941 which precipitated or accelerated the radical changes which took place between 1945 and the end of the Vietnam war. The sheer speed and success of the Japanese successes against numerically superior defending forces in Southeast Asia made a strong impression on opinion in the erstwhile colonies. The Japanese failed to capitalize on that in the sense that after early political successes in encouraging nationalist and pro-Japanese movements the appeal to shared Asian interests lost plausibility in the face of Japanese policies and actions which were exploitative or worse. Although Japan lost the war and left wounds in the region which are still not healed, the war precipitated the end of the moribund European colonial era, and accelerated the creation of independent states largely within borders established by the colonial empires. For some years trade and other economic links remained predominantly in the old colon ial grooves but with the economic supremacy of the United States and then with Japan embarked on decades of the highest rates of economic growth the world had yet seen, those patterns diversified. In the region the United States and Japan became the two most important outside powers and that was reflected inter alia by their leading roles in the setting up of the Asian Development Bank in 1966. By that time Australia[3] too had perforce diversified its trade away from Britain which had made it clear that it would seek its future economic arrangements in Europe and the Commonwealth arrangements which had supported much of Australias traditional export industry were phased out. Australia turned to Japan and others for new markets (a trade agreement with Japan had already been made in 1957). Australias development assistance programme had from the beginning concentrated on Southeast Asia and become and increasingly important instrument for involving this country with the region, especially as significant numbers of students from the region came to our universities and other institutions under the Colombo Plan and successor programmes.The failure of the attempted coup in Indonesia, the Gestapu of 30 September 1965, and the subsequent establishment of the New Order government there opened the way to overcome the regional or sub-regional strains produced by President Sukarnos eff orts to crush the newly-constructed Malaysia, as well as other tensions created or exacerbated by the Sukarno policies. In this climate ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations, was established in 1967 and set out on its long and successful course of gradually building a sense of common interest and regional association among the six (originally five) members. ASEAN recently embarked on the development of AFTA, the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. ASEAN has become the key institution in Southeast Asia not only because of its success in developing a sense of community among its very disparate members, and in finding a road for them to closer economic cooperation. It has also become the forum for discussion with the main world powers on a wide range of matters. This has come about through an annual mechanism of post-Ministerial consultations held after ASEANs own internal consultations through which ASEAN member governments, at Foreign Minister level, meet with their counterparts. These counterparts, termed dialogue partners, currently are Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and the United States. In 1994 discussions on regional security were further developed with the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which groups ASEAN and its dialogue partners with Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea. Looking at the recent evolution of Southeast Asia perhaps the most sig nificant thing has been the change that has occurred since the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of communism. Until relatively recently the centrally planned economy model had much attraction for many developing countries and there was up to the beginning of the eighties quite widespread aversion to capitalism and to the liberal market model as exemplified by the Western industrialized countries. Now virtually all of Southeast Asia is committed to market economics, albeit with more governmental political control than in the Western countries. There is a virtual unanimity about the commitment to economic development based on relatively open markets, private ownership and competition. With that has come a period of unprecedented economic growth. The major economies of Southeast Asia are all growing at rates previously thought unattainable for a sustained period. There are of course some uncertainties about the future; but there are few who doubt that Southeast Asia will early i n the twenty-first century be a major centre of economic power and influence. Southeast Asia has traditionally been a site of great power competition for regional dominance, due to its strategic location as a bridge between continental and maritime East Asia. To manage this competition and to enhance their own sub regional autonomy, the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) engaged in a number of regional institution building initiatives during the early 1990s. This institutionalism agenda led to speculation that ASEAN could become the hub of a nascent regional security community following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, however, the prospect that ASEAN could act as an autonomous entity to mitigate Sino-U.S. geopolitical pressures seemed increasingly tenuous. Weakened by political and economic instability, intra-regional disputes and a simultaneous expansion of its membership, ASEAN has come to question its own identity. This has only further undermined ASEAN-led regional security initiatives such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF ). More frequently, Southeast Asian states have favored bilateralism and have looked to external powers to realize their security interests. These changing sub regional dynamics have, in turn, prompted renewed efforts by China and the United States to cultivate influence within Southeast Asia. Chinas attempts to gain support for its new security concept and US efforts to secure additional access and infrastructure agreements along the East Asian littoral are illustrative. To some extent, Sino-U.S. geopolitical competition has been modified by strategic cooperation resulting from the war on terror. China still remains wary of U.S. attempts to engage Southeast Asia in countering global terrorism. These trends have, in turn, compelled analysts to reconceptualize the Southeast Asian security landscape in a balance of power context. It is clear continental Southeast Asian states have aligned with China and maritime Southeast Asian states have aligned with the United States. The geographi c position of China and the United States, and the evolution of their interests and military capabilities accordingly, make it unlikely that either country would seek to project power into the others respective sphere. Southeast Asian states maintain a position of equidistance between the great powers. She attributes this to the ASEAN states general distrust of great powers and their desire to maintain the delicate Sino-U.S. regional balance. CHAPTER IV POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH EAST ASIA China sleeps, when she wakes, the World will tremble Napoleon The South east Asian countries over the past four decades has transformed itself from a region with enormous economic and political problems to one blessed with relative peace and prosperity. In particular the five ASEAN economies, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand , grew strongly in the 1960s with an average rate of 6 percent. This buoyant economic performance continued in the 1970s with 7.3 percent as they benefited from the massive inflows of the foreign exchange earnings due to sharp increase in the world price of primary commodities, including two oil shocks which benefited some of the members the same period. In the 1980s the region slowed down to an average growth rate of 6.1 percent. Regional economies experienced recessionary conditions due to high interest rate policy of the US Federal Reserve Bank, the consequent debt crisis in the region, the recession in the ASEANs major trading and investment partners, and the fall in the world prices of the primary commodities. But there was also a positive trend of influx of export- oriented foreign direct investment from Japan and the NIEs following the strong appreciation of their currencies. The recovery from 1991 to 1996 was followed by an economic contraction in 1997-98 due to the crisis which began in Thailand in July 1997 and spread to other parts of the region. In 1999-2000, the ASEAN economies staged a dramatic recovery with Singapore and Malaysia leading, things again turned sour with the September 11 attacks and the lackluster performance of the export sector. There was again a decrease in the economic growth due to the SARS, Iraq cri sis and terrorist related attacks, slump in the electronic market and collapse of the WTO talks in Cancun. The global economy is most rapid in emerging Asia where GDP accelerated to 7.2 percent in 2003, accounting for about 50 per cent of world growth. Looking forward, growth is projected to remain high at 7.4 per cent in 2004 and 7.0 per cent in 2005. The IMF stated that while domestic demand growth has increased significantly in emerging Asia, the regional current account surpluses remain very large, with exports supported by the rebound in the information technology (IT) sector as well as depreciating exchange rates. In the ASEAN-4, Thailand has shown the strongest expansion at 6.7 per cent in 2003, and is expected to remain high at 7 per cent in 2004 and 6.7 per cent in 2005. Cyclical considerations and high levels of public debt necessitate fiscal prudence for Thai authorities. The Malaysian economy is also recovering strongly and is expected to continue with inflation and unemployment remaining at low levels. However, the main policy priorities are the implementation of the announced fiscal consolidation to achieve a balanced budget by the year 2006 and greater exchange rate flexibility accompanied with suitable macroeconomic policies. Indonesias modest growth continues to be driven by private consumption, and has been accompanied with lower inflation. The Indonesian government should continue to implement its planned fiscal consolidation. Moreover, it needs to sustain banking, legal and judicial reforms in order to provide a better investment climate conducive to higher growth. As for the Philippines, uncertainties remain high even after the May 2, 2004 presidential elections. The main concerns of the Philippine government include increasing the tax revenues, restructuring the power sector, strengthening the banking sector, and improving the business system. Following the SARS crisis, the Singapore economy recovered in 2003 with supportive macroeconomic policies. To enhance its medium-term competitiveness and growth prospects, the IMF recommends a deepening and acceleration of reforms including further divestment of government  ­linked companies Issues and Challenges for Southeast Asian/ASEAN Domestic policy issues and challenges. On the domestic front, the growth prospects for ASEAN are very much dependent on various factors including the ability of their respective governments to provide economic, political and social stability, implement economic reforms, and diversify their economies. ASEAN policy makers thus face the following challenges: Sound macroeconomic environment. Following the 1997/98 economic crisis, government budget deficits relative to GDP have broadly increased and this is of serious concern for ASEAN governments, particularly for Malaysia and the Philippines. Price instability has become a serious concern for Indonesia and the Philippines. Exchange rates in Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines and Myanmar have weakened significantly. Moreover, the rising levels of foreign debt in the Philippines and Indonesia could create additional uncertainties. In terms of the current account surplus as a proportion of GDP, the six older ASEAN members have broadly shown higher levels relative to Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV countries). Thus, in order to achieve a sound macroeconomic environment, ASEAN economies need to adopt a prudent fiscal policy, low inflation rates, stable exchange rates, and manageable levels of external debt and current account balance. Stable political and business environment. The political environment in some countries has been affected by military uprisings, kidnappings, bombings and other terrorist-related activities, peoples demonstrations, and elections. A 1997 survey of Japanese firms conducted by JETRO indicated that political stability is considered as the most significant determinant of Japanese investments in ASEAN. Thus Southeast Asian governments need to find ways and means towards achieving and maintaining a politically stable environment in order to encourage domestic and foreign investments. Social Harmony. ASEAN countries need to address issues such as conflicts between racial groups (e.g. the Chinese and pribumis in Indonesia, and the Chinese and bumiputras in Malaysia), between religious groups (e.g. the Muslims and Christians in Southern Philippines) and between the poor and rich. Despite all the policies and resources spent on alleviating poverty and reducing income inequality, unemployment, poverty and income inequality continue to be the major policy concerns of ASEAN governments. In reality, it is very difficult to reduce poverty and narrow the income gap given the interplay of politics, economics and industry, and the conflicting goals of the various interest groups in the economy like businesses, religious groups, the elite, farmers, small and medium entrepreneurs, etc. Thailands income gap between the rich and the poor was the widest in the world (Bangkok Post, 2S Aug 2003). In the Philippines, Gerard Clark and Marites Sison (2003) in their study titled liDo t he well-off really care about the plight of the poor? revealed that majority of the respondents suggested that some elite people cared while others did not; and those who did care did too little or acted primarily out of self-interest. In fact, there are some people in the superior group like the elite who wish the poor to remain poor because of the benefits that can be derived from their poverty. For instance, politicians often depend on the poor at elections time for support that propels them to political office. Economic Reforms. Southeast Asian governments need to continue implementing economic reforms that include market opening, trade, investment and financial liberalization. These reforms are particularly crucial for the CLMV countries as they undergo transition from centrally planned to market  ­oriented economies and for the crisis-hit countries especially Indonesia and Thailand. In the case of Indonesia, there was a lack of seriousness on the part of the political leadership to undertake economic reforms. For example, there were delays in the removal of tariff control and the privatization of state assets and enterprises, so that the process of reforms is reverting to protectionism. Furthermore, a delay in the IMFs financial assistance added to the ineffectiveness of Indonesias recovery programme. Thailand completed its 34-month Stand-By Arrangement from the IMF that formed part of an international financial package worth US$17.2 billion from multilateral and bilateral lenders. Outs tanding obligations at end-June 2002 amounted to US$6.4 billion and repayment was finally completed on July 31,2003, some two years ahead of schedule a significant achievement on the part of the Thai government. Economic Diversion. Various factors impel ASEAN economies to continue to diversify their economies: volatile and broadly declining primary commodity prices, depletion of non-renewable primary resources such as oil and gas, and the high costs of production. Following the decline in crude oil prices in the 1980s, Brunei and Indonesia have begun to diversify their economies from oil towards non-oil products and services (finance, tourism). Because of the high costs of production (e.g. high labour costs), Singapores economy has emphasised the significant contribution of the services sector (IT, education, tourism, finance). The services sector has accounted for about 60-70 per cent of Singapores GDP. Moreover, to improve the competitiveness of Singapores manufactured products and services, several cost-cutting measures have been implemented, namely, cuts in contribution rates for mandatory saving, reduction in corporate taxes, and reduction in utility charges. Long-run policies include t raining and re-training programmes for workers and greater focus on RD activities for innovations and improvement in technology. In Singapore, there are more than 600,000 workers with secondary education or lower. As such, it is extremely important that these workers upgrade their skills and learn new tasks to be more productive and to be more employable in the future. There are also other schemes such as the job re-design programmes implemented by the Singapore Productivity and Standards Board which involves changing both job content and arrangement to encourage workers to become more productive. Other ASEAN countries can learn from Singapores experiences with regard to cost-cutting measures, training and re-training programmes, and RD activities to improve productivity and competitiveness. Multi-Ethnic States. Multi-ethnicity is a dominant feature of the region and therefore stable inter-state ties and intra-state ethnic stability are closely intertwined. The region has to work toward the stability and security of strong, secular, federal multi- ethnic states if it is to remain secure and stable in the coming years. The Challenge of Democratisaton. The other key political challenge that confronts South East Asian nations is how to build stable, democratic state structures in condition of a rising tide of expectations for better life and greater liberty. Through much of Asia, the struggle between pressures for democratization against existing authoritarian state structures or oppressive socio-political conditions is a reality. Human rights abuses are common in many of the states. In Myanmar and Indonesia there is a rising pressure for political change and expansion of political rights. Militancy, insurgency and terrorism have wracked many parts of ASEAN region in the past and continue to do so even now. Only through steady democratization, decentralization and provision of caring and efficient governance can the integrity of state structures and stability be preserved. CHAPTER V Chinese political and economical strategy in South East Asia. China perceives itself as a central power on Earth. The rest of the World is an array of greater and lesser powers which neither have unified structure nor a single head Macnall Mark[4] Chinas political and economic strategy are interlinked with the security relation that China shares with the Southeast Asia as a region. China embraced the Southeast Asian regionalism and of multilateralism with Southeast Asia is part of broader decision to jettison Chinas old confrontational policy and style. Chinese leaders officials turned this approach to South east Asia on its head replacing the assertiveness that characterized pre 1997 Chinese policy with accommodation. This concerted campaign assuaged South east Asian fears but also paved the way for South east Asian and Chinese to participate in and profit from this rapidly expanding economic ties. Chinese leaders and officials smoothly employed diplomacy in innumerable meeting with South east Asian counterparts to slowly and carefully win greater influence in south east Asia. The Chinese foreign policy community made a concerted effort to represent Chinas reemergence as a regional power. It portrayed recent trends as aligne d with the economic and security interests of its southern neighbors. China convinced the neighbors that it is not a threat. China employed the same set of instruments of Chinese national security policy at both multilateral level with ASEAN and bilateral level with individual ASEAN states albeit with differing effects in the countries concerned depending on their individual circumstances. It places contentious issues temporarily to the side, places processes before product and welcomes efforts to build EAST ASIAN community. Beijing binds the South East Asean countries with a spectrum of economic, political and cultural and security proposals. As Beijing courted its southern neighbors, it supplemented diplomacy with economic ties in terms of trade and economic investment. China opened China to overseas ethnic Chinese and invited ethnic Chinese Southeast Asians to invest in China and subsequently invited Southeast Asians. Rapid increases in the Southeast Asian- China trade led to ove rcome the financial crisis. Chinas economic success has been as impressive as its diplomatic campaign, because china and Southeast Asian countries have been competitors both FDI and for developed markets in Japan,Europe and the United States. Beijing has worked assiduously tp provide Southeast Asian economies with a stake in Chinas economic expansion thus stabilizing Chinas periphery and contributing to Chinas own economic growth. Chinas turn to multilateralism diplomacy was to compliment its intense bilateral diplomacy was timely. ASEAN grew during the 1990 and accommodated new countries and also in the due course of time it had not been able to respond to the financial crisis and also the turmoil in East Timor. Chinas help to ASEAN gave a new appearance to ASEAN. Multilateral diplomacy provided a two way street for ASEAN countries and China and provided measures to forge new bonds. ASEAN also

cuban missle crisis: a front row seat for the end of the world :: essays research papers

  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  A Front Row Seat for the End of the World   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚     Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  During the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, I had a front row seat. I was Under Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and, as a consequence, a member of President John Kennedy’s Executive Committee (ExComm) which dealt with our response. I believe I was the only one permitted to keep notes of the meetings, and have from time to time referred to them over the years. However, my recollections of our debates have been stimulated with the recent release of edited transcripts of the discussions.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  When in mid–October reconnaissance photos revealed that the Soviets were building missiles and bomber bases in Cuba, I was not surprised. Since July, there had been an increase in shipping from Soviet ports to Mariel in Cuba. On October 11, the French reported that their diplomats had seen trucks loaded with what appeared to be tarpaulin– covered missiles lumbering through Havana at night. I thought it probable that these were indeed offensive missiles, despite Soviet pledges that they would never put bases in Cuba and only defensive weapons. My thought at the time was that whatever Moscow was up to in Cuba was somehow connected with the lingering crisis over Berlin which had begun the previous August when the East Germans began to construct a wall sealing off the eastern sector. I believed that Khrushchev, recognizing that the importance of the city to the West made the risk of war high, was lying low on that crisis while creating a new one in Cuba with the intent of trading one off against the other, perhaps gaining leverage for concessions. But there were other reasons that the possibility of missiles in Cuba was not far–fetched. During the Berlin crisis, most of our contingency planning for military options had been based on estimates of impressive Soviet conventional and nuclear capabilities. For that reason, we had thought the possibility of escalation into a nuclear war was likely, and the Soviets could hit us very hard. However since then, the double agent Penkovskiy had confirmed what our own intelligence had been suggesting: that Soviet nuclear capabilities had been overestimated, and that we held the advantage—evidently one of the reasons why Moscow was putting intermediate and medium range missiles in Cuba. I viewed the existence of the missiles as a serious threat. They could reach any number of targets in the United States in a short time and, since we had set up no southern early warning system, a surprise attack would put us in a difficult position.

The Development of Route 128 in Boston

In my paper I will show how the development of Route 128 in Boston, Massachusetts started, and how it exists today. Boston has changed throughout the years in its Renewal reform within its planning of the city mainly on route 128 as well as other major routes though out Boston. Boston had many changes made within the neighborhoods, which have, major routes in which effected the people lives as well as their living conditions. In some cases good in others for the worse. It separated and defined districts in which it no longer keeps the city as a whole. Boston is a set of distinctly different districts and neighborhoods, each with it's own defining identity and unique characteristics. Boston as a whole, benefit's from the contributions from each of these areas and it is truly what gives the city it's charm and unique differences. However, it had no other choice but to confront a major problem in which it had to face. Massachusetts lacked an organized framework within it's planning of cities and routes. The correlation between these neighborhoods has been an ongoing problem, which are being resolved. Even though Boston is making the changes which they feel are necessary, there are a few cases that are not being updated or corrected, and in many cases it has gotten worse due to the poor layout or problems that have arisen. On the other hand, Boston has many successful neighborhoods that are successful entities, and also hold a strong sense of self identify. But at the present time, there are areas that are inaccessible. This le! ads to a disordered city that can be more enjoyed and appreciated if it had a stronger structure! The characteristic of Boston as a collection of neighborhoods is due to its increase speed in growth from the days of its settlement in 1630. Unlike the many traditional American cities, which are usually based on an orthogonal grid, Boston never had a long-term strategy towards planning. The Boston area did however grow, modified itself, and evolved in a reactionary way as technological advancements came about which affected society as a whole. The original Shawmut peninsula, which at one point contained all of Boston, now only constitutes a fraction of the landmass of the city. A major portion of the city today exists on landfill claimed from the Boston harbor and Charles River. Expansion and development created the need for more land area. The Back Bay, West End, and much of south Boston are examples of this growth. As these areas were created they added to the existing city but they also had their own distinctiveness, which added to the other surrounding towns as well as Boston on a whole. These new created towns, were and are positive in many ways but they were never really integrated into the existing city central mainframe. This lead to! aking Boston a bit more disorganized. Thus, solving some problems, but creating others. Within the past fifty years the construction of the main central city of Boston in the 1950's and the urban renewal projects beginning in the 1960's inflated this urban problem. The suburbanization of America within its states and related migration of city inhabitants to border towns created a need for expanded automobile transportation in cities throughout the United States. In reaction to this, major routes and highways were constructed to connect suburban life to the cities. This encouraged more people to move out of the city, but not as far away that they couldn't maintain their jobs within the main city. Boston had been changing from its historic and original focus as a port city to a city based on business and finance. The routes and central pathway was intended to assist this growth, and make the downtown more accessible. Boston's West End is one of the most documented neighborhoods destroyed by urban renewal. Around 60% of the families, which were displaced by the urba! n renewal were Hispanic or Blacks. West End was mainly working class Italians. It had narrow streets and had a large amount of social life within it. This situation was viewed as un-American for middle class standards of city planners, which lead it to be demolished around 1959, and was replaced with high rises and expensive apartment buildings. The highway that city planners created lead to growth in and out of the city, and now in the modern era with changes in society, it became a necessity in our modern civilization. The routes circle around Boston (I-128 & I-95) and cut though the city (I-90) like a foreign object. Cutting it's way through Boston, it also broke up the city as a whole, creating boundaries between the cities, the harbor front, north end, and downtown. Boston had created a larger suburb for itself and pulled away from its history of being one of the most highly used water port that have been used for years. What was at one time considered one of the largest ! ports in the country was being abandoned and forgotten about. The mass departure from urban areas throughout the country led to an identity crisis for many urban areas. In response, The Federal Urban Renewal Program was created. Boston was a leader in this movement, and had several projects gain nationwide recognition. The Boston Redevelopment Authority approached the renewal in a way that would ultimately prove detrimental. The B. R. A. designated separate districts for administrative and funding reasons. Each district was dealt with as a separate entity with regards to their individual needs. A good comparison would be Silicon Valley, CA and Route 128, MA, which are considered two of the premiere technological concentrations, not only in the United States, but also in the world. These are regions that since World War II have been devoted to the creation of new information technology. By comparing the two regions I will try to show the different means by which an economic unit can attain success in the information revolution, and point out which strategies are most valuable to long-term success. Many people have attributed the success of the Valley primarily to the influence of nearby institutions of higher education, particularly Stanford University. In the 1920's, administrators at Stanford sought to improve the prestige of their institution by hiring highly respected faculty members from East Coast universities. One important recruit was Fred Terman, an electrical engineer from MIT. Like many of his colleagues, he performed cutting-edge research in electronics. Unlike many other members of the faculty, though, he encouraged his students to sell applications of these new-technologies in the marketplace. By providing funds and equipment, Terman enabled two of his first recruits, David Hewlett and William Packard, to commercialize the audio-oscillator in the late 1930s. After selling their first oscillators to Disney Corporation, they reinvested their earnings and expanded both their products and their range of customers. In 1950, twelve years after its founding, Hewlett-Packard had 200 employees and sold 70 different products with sales over $2 million. It pioneered the formation of a distinctive Silicon Valley management style, treating workers as family members. Numerous workers have sought to duplicate Hewlett-Packard's management style. In 1954, they accepted an offer by Stanford University to rent part of Stanford Research Park for their operations. This brought together various industries in Palo Alto. Many other firms subsequently rented other plots of land to take advantage of proximity to the university. Stanford Research Park, through the efforts of a few influential professors and university administrators, became the nucleus of the budding Silicon Valley. By the 1980s, the entire park had been rented out to area firms. This rapid rise of technology reflects itself in the organization of Silicon Valley. The people who began or were employed in these new firms considered themselves as technological trailblazers. The residents of this technological society were, a strongly homogenous group: white, male, Stanford or MIT educated engineers who migrated to California from other regions of the country. As modern-day pioneers, they were especially responsive to risky ventures that had the potential for great rewards. As people in the region became occupationally mobile, their roles became interchangeable: employers become employees and co-workers can become competitors. The result is that the engineers developed strong loyalties to technology and their fellow engineers and scientists while possessing far less allegiance to a single firm The traditional delineations between employers and employees were not so sharp as on the East Coast, and in some cases they disappeared entirely. Beginning with Hewlett and Packard, many of the Silicon Valley companies sought a much more interactive environment between employers and employees. Decentralization of powers followed. With respect to its industrial emphasis (electronics), the Route 128 region around Boston presents a study in contrast in terms of its historical development, geography, community life, and degree of interconnectivity between firms. Similar to Silicon Valley, the development of electronics-related companies on the 65-mile highway surrounding Boston and Cambridge in the area's major research universities was influenced by academia, industry, and government. The professors and graduate students in the universities devote their energies toward a greater understanding of the world around them. The government, particularly federal agencies such as the Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation, provides the financial support for the academicians to test the hypothesis and perform the experiments. The firms would then produce the physical expressions of these ideas for the marketplace. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, like its counterpart in Palo Alto, has engaged in world class scientific research and has produced some of the best engineers in the country. The Institute has sought to provide the theoretical and practical foundations for its students to make major contributions to society. While doing so, it has engaged in a seemingly endless number of advancements and has tried to reach out to large companies in Massachusetts and outside the state as well as participate in many federal and state-run projects. The Federal government, to a much greater extent in this state than in California, has provided the fuel for the region's expansion. By the late 1990s, Massachusetts was one of the top five states in terms of federal research resources granted. The Department of Defense itself has accounted for over 60% of federal research and development spending in the state. Consequently, the large firms have profited most. In the 1970s and 80s, Raytheon became one of the most important contractors for the Department of Defense; EG&G Inc. has filled several contracts for NASA. Some smaller organizations in this Beltway have been created to solely fill government orders. Organizations ranging from the National Science Foundation (NSF) to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to the Department of Energy (DOE) provided universities and firms millions of dollars for research. Whole new industries have sprung up from these efforts: computers, biotechnology, and artificial intelligence, among others. The third leg of this technological triangle, complementing the universities and government agencies, is industry itself. By 1990, the state contained over 3,000 high-technology firms. Some companies stand as the pillars of the 128 community: Digital Equipment Corporation, Raytheon, and Lotus Development. These companies produced a disproportionate share of the region's income generation As they grew, so too did the accompanying service firms. The communities in which the high-tech enterprises sprung up, towns such as Burlington, Lexington, and Cambridge have established roots in eastern Massachusetts going back centuries. Companies such as DEC and Lotus Development are in many ways just descendants of other industrial titans that have crowded this area for over 150 years. The structures of Boston society have resulted in relatively stable and conservative hold on certain aspects of its residents' life. Engineers who have worked on both coasts report a much greater divide between work and play on the East Coast. Entrepreneurs such as Ken Olsen at DEC and An Wang at Wang industries who succeeded did not change their lifestyles in any radical way. Olsen, for example, avoided most social gatherings, remained a teetotaler, lived in a small home, and continued to drive an old Ford to work. He and other area CEOs did not live the same high profile lives in Boston that their counterparts did in Silicon Valley. The lack of role models and less developed informal social contacts may have constrained the amount of new companies that were created in the 1970s and 1980s. The defense industry, hiring practices, and the region's geography all conspired to reinforce this traditionalism. The volume of military purchases encouraged corporate separateness. The h! iring of management differs substantially from Silicon Valley. In Massachusetts, older individuals, usually wedded to the status-quo, are often selected for executive positions Managers in Silicon Valley, often in their twenties and thirties, are much more likely to experiment with organization. Geography also plays a role. The firms were more spread out around metropolitan Boston than comparable companies in California, lessening the probability of interaction. Communication between company and town is even less prevalent. Many large companies such as DEC have almost no ties to the towns in which they were located. The hierarchies within companies are extremely rigid. The manager created firms with complex and sophisticated organizational patterns that employed individuals to be loyal first and foremost to the company. In return for the loyalty, employees expected that hard work would enable them to stay employed in the firm and rise through the ranks, culminating in retirement with a large pension. Employers are generally wary of hiring an engineer or programmer who has left another firm after only a few years. At the same time, significant status differences exist. The hierarchy of positions and the means of formal communication within the firm, along with the structure of salaries and benefits, developed strong delineation's within the firm. At DEC, for example, the company centralized many of its prominent functions and a small group of individuals made the decisions, namely Ken Olson (the CEO). The companies attempt to internalize many of their procedures. This vertical integration ! often includes: software design, component, peripheral, and subsystem production, and final assembly. In short, Route 128 firms are much more settled and centralized affairs than the scientists and engineers in northern California. Their histories, attitudes, and strategies have created technological societies similar in products manufactured but very different in their economic and social appearance. With the onset of the computer generation big named companies bought land off of this highway. This lead to an enormous clotting into Route 128, which is considered the edge of Boston (it circles around the main Downtown metropolitan area). Route 128 became a big commodity to the new generation of large computer technology based industries. The highway began to get congested, with the onslaught of new businesses. All these new businesses in turn lead to major traffic jams. Real estate around route 128 increased dramatically, which appealed more to the upper middle class. Large apartment complexes around the area were sequentially created. With the suppression of the new renewals to towns in Boston as well as the downtown city, a lot of opportunities arose to deal with the large amount of issues that had come from linkages between the various neighborhoods within the main city. Each town is being dealt with, but with respect to it's own uniqueness, and it's contribution toward making Boston more unified within. Despite the rapid growth of the towns around route 128, it hit a point where the business industry came to a standstill in the 90's. Things that lead to this sudden halt, was due to the region from northern Rhode Island to southern New Hampshire, which ran out of space for expansional development that maintained and held up the large boom for this hot area.. Existing companies couldn't expand more, which meant less jobs were being offered to the large amounts of people migrating for jobs from these companies. As the companies grew with time, there became higher demand for their products. Another factor to! the standstill in business expansion was due to other large companies which where not based around Route 128 (such as Compaq in Houston, Texas, and Microsoft in Seattle) which made huge profits and revenue. This distant competition drew attention away from the â€Å"hub†. By the end of the 20th Century, Boston was at maximum capacity and could not lend itself anymore to expansion. Route 128 was one of the first beltways built in America. Its ten-mile radius circles the Boston area in an arc shape. Close by is route I-495 that is goes from Rhode Island and ends closely to the beginning of New Hampshire. Both the belts have many intersections throughout it's span that lead from downtown Boston and into the heart of the states which boarders around. With all the intersections that go through these routes a high capacity of people can access these major belts. This was the reason for the success and decline of â€Å"The Hub†. The smaller stores and companies such as the food industry, benefited from the large companies due to its high employee population servicing the smaller businesses. With the success of Route 128, some towns have grown out of the heavily used belts like Quincy-Braintree. Since the companies couldn't build anymore on the belt, they moved some of their departments a bit further from the main headquarters, to areas which are easily assessable from many other routes and connectors in the Boston area. This cut down on the flow of drivers into the highly packed corporate beltway area, which alleviated more congestion, and it made everyone a bit less stressed. Going along I-128 towards the west, brings us to the Mass. Pike. This connection is one good reason that I-128 became the â€Å"technology road†, because it connected to other states as well as the rest of Boston. Mass Pike is the oldest beltway in the Boston area.. Going up Northwest on the beltway is where route 128 intersects and meets route 3 and I-93. This area is one of the most congested of any part of the Boston area. This area is the center of the Lahey Medical Center as well as the Bu! rlington Mall. The Peabody and Danvers area, which is also on the Northwest part of I-128, is where I-95 resumes its route to Maine. Since it's low-point in the mid-1990s, when several big companies severed or trimmed their ties to the area, Route128 has returned to prominence as one of the nation's premier high-tech zones. And the rejuvenation hasn't been limited to just this highway that loops around Boston, but has expanded to other parts of the metro area as well. Unfortunately since planning is never predictable what could have been more of a commodity Route 128 became exploited and overdone. What recourses that could have been attained such as location, convenience and easy access to suburbs; Route 128 became a city within itself and lost the suburban idealism which was originally sought after. Even though it was seemingly sufficient in space Route 128 has exceeded its limitations. This proves to be a learning experience in that Route 128 although successful in most of its purposes was a failure when it lost its ideals of functioning as a suburb.

Strategic Human Resource Management - 5404 Words

Q. Critically analyse the article for the meaning of strategic human resource management and identify the factors impacting on strategic human resource management in contemporary organisations. Before an argument can be put in place about whether human resource management (HRM) can be strategic, we need to be aware that human resources (HR) is more then maintaining personal functions. Corporate and economic developments since the 1950 ¡Ã‚ ¦s have dictated that businesses, to remain competitive, need to view HRM as an evolutionary process which combines the HR functions with the HR policies and strategies, with the business strategies and management teams, with all stakeholders (Unions and Governments) and with the organisation and†¦show more content†¦For example, William M Mercer Pty Limited emphasises the fact that it is one of the greatest employers of qualifies Actuaries in the world meaning that if the rare mathematical skills of an Actuary are required then the client would contact Mercer and not a competitor who would not have the required skills. HR policies to achieve rareness include graduate recruitment programs and ensuring that the skill of these so rt of people (those with the rare skills) are being used appropriately and not in a role that could be completed by some one less qualified and less rare. Strategic HR should also focus on ensuring that the characteristics of a firm are not easily imitated or copied by others (imitability in the VIRO model). Creating a niche market for your firm can be achieved by ensuring your product or service can not be provided by another firm. The HR policies must be adapted so that the company is seen as unique, these policies may be to provide greater decision making power and work place flexibility to employees or to prosper initiative and communication between all stakeholders such as the executive, the line-managers and the clients. Finally in the VIRO framework, how the Organisation is structured can impact upon achieving competitive advantage. The HRM team of a firm must work with senior and middle management to that they have the right number of skilled people in the right place at the correct time to meet the needs of the consumers. ToShow MoreRelatedHuman Resource Management and Strategic Human Resource Management1136 Words   |  5 PagesManaging Human Resources, 3rd edn, John Wiley Sons, Milton, Qld. In chapter 1 of the text, the author shows an overview of human resource management and strategic human resource management. The author also shows the relationship between HRM and management, manager’s role meaning of strategy, strategic approach to HRM and strategic challenges. Lots of diagrams and explanations are used by the author. This chapter has contributed to my understanding of strategic human resource management by analysingRead MoreStrategic Management : Strategic Human Resource Management Essay1864 Words   |  8 Pages Unit 2 The Reyes Fitness Centers, Inc: The Strategic HR Opportunity Michael Lambert GB520 - Strategic Human Resource Management December 6, 2016 Professor Kenneth Rauch â€Æ' What is Strategic Management? Through this case study I will be discussing strategic management. 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